A twelve-year milestone in dialogue between Bangkok and Malay separatists sits awkwardly alongside a continuing cycle of violence in Thailand’s southernmost provinces. As negotiators mark years of talks, the region’s wounds remain open, and a fragile quiet during Ramadan has raised hopes that diplomacy might resume. Yet fresh insurgent attacks underscore how cessation of hostilities has often followed, rather than preceded, negotiations. The parties, aided by a regional facilitator, face a daunting task: preserve momentum for dialogue while violence persists and domestic politics evolve in Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur.
Background: The southern insurgency and the BRN
Since 2004, the conflict in Thailand’s southernmost provinces has drawn blood and fear into communities along the border with Malaysia. The casualty toll—roughly 7,680 lives—reflects a long-running pattern of bombings, shootings, and clashes that has become disturbingly routine for residents. This violence has remained largely under the international radar, even as it shapes the political landscape of the Thai state and the region’s security posture. The insurgency is led by various groups, with the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Patani (BRN) at the forefront, describing its struggle as anti-colonial against the Thai government.
The BRN frames its struggle as a fight for political rights, cultural recognition, and a greater say in governance for Malay Muslims in the southern border provinces. The Thai state, for its part, has framed its response in terms of counter-insurgency and public safety, while also signaling a willingness to explore political solutions that address long-standing grievances. The conflict thus sits at the intersection of security, identity, politics, and regional dynamics, with Malaysia’s role as a mediator offering a historical and practical bridge between Bangkok and insurgent groups. The persistence of violence, despite dialogues and cease-fire signals, suggests that deep-seated concerns—ranging from local governance to education, development, and autonomy—require careful, inclusive, and trustworthy negotiation mechanisms.
Over the years, multiple phases of dialogue have been pursued, with the aim of reducing violence, opening public consultations in the southern provinces, and working toward some form of political settlement. The Joint Comprehensive Plan Toward Peace (JCPP) has been presented as a framework, envisaging a staged approach to tension-reduction alongside avenues for political dialogue. However, the BRN’s delegation has repeatedly refused to sign, citing the need to refine certain points, while Thai negotiators have pressed for clarity and momentum. The result has been a pattern in which both sides send signals of readiness, yet substantive agreement remains elusive. The backdrop to every new round is a history of failed steps, mutual suspicion, and a shared desire—at times explicit, at other times tacit—to avoid a collapse of talks that could unleash renewed violence.
In this delicate environment, regional diplomacy, particularly under Malaysia’s leadership within ASEAN, takes on added significance. The prospect of a negotiated settlement in the Thai south is not only about ceasefires and security; it is also about how the region manages inter-state relations, addresses cross-border violence, and underpins regional stability. The BRN’s position, the Thai government’s priorities, and the evolving regional context together determine whether diplomacy can translate into durable changes on the ground or whether the status quo persists with only episodic reductions in violence.
The peace process: Malaysia’s mediation and the JCPP framework
Malaysia’s role as a facilitator has been central in shaping the tempo and terms of engagement between Bangkok and the BRN. For more than a decade, Kuala Lumpur has provided a bridge between the Thai state and insurgent actors, trying to create channels for dialogue that bypass unilateral escalations and maintain an avenue for constructive exchanges. The peace process rests on a delicate balance: a willingness by both sides to engage in talks and, simultaneously, a credible demonstration that violence can be reduced without compromising core national interests or regional security. The JCPP, as a formal framework, promises a structured pathway toward peace through steps that include violence reduction, public consultation in the southern provinces, and a political solution that could accommodate local aspirations within the Thai constitutional framework.
But the process has faced frequent frictions. The BRN delegation’s decision not to sign the JCPP during the seventh plenary round in February of the previous year signaled a fundamental point of contention: the need to refine or reinterpret certain terms before any formal endorsement could be considered legitimate by the group. Thai officials described this refusal as a setback, while the BRN argued that more precise formulations were required to ensure a durable agreement that genuinely reflects the complexities on the ground. The Thai side, in turn, faced its own strategic questions: how to maintain momentum, how to manage domestic political pressures, and how to reassure skeptical constituencies that any agreement would yield meaningful, long-term improvements in security and governance for southern residents.
In the months that followed, there were intermittent signals of willingness to proceed. The government and the BRN explored the possibility of resuming dialogue, with a shared interest in testing whether a reduction in violence could serve as a confidence-building measure that might unlock a broader political settlement. The facilitator’s role remained crucial: to maintain lines of communication, encourage transparency, and establish a mechanism — including monitoring — that both sides could trust. Yet confidence in the process continued to hinge on the ability of Bangkok and the BRN to demonstrate credible commitments to restraint, verification, and compliance. The JCPP’s broader value lies in creating expectations among the communities affected by the violence that there is a viable path toward peace, rather than a perpetual cycle of negotiations followed by renewed clashes.
Within this framework, observers have stressed that what happens during Ramadan could take on outsized symbolic weight. The concept of reducing hostilities during a holy month is not merely a tactical pause; it is a signal about the seriousness of the negotiation process and the willingness of the parties to accept a temporary shift in dynamics to facilitate dialogue. The regional context adds another layer of complexity: any formal move toward a ceasefire or a sustained reduction in violence must be credible not only to the parties involved but also to neighboring countries and international partners who watch the southern crisis closely.
Ramadan talks and declarations: reductions in violence as a signal, not a precondition
February saw high-level statements from Thai leadership intended to frame Ramadan as a period during which violence would be minimized as a demonstration of both sides’ capacity to restrain themselves. Deputy Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai publicly signaled that the government hoped Ramadan would proceed without violent incidents, presenting this as evidence of the militants’ ability to “stop creating violence.” A few days later, the National Security Council issued a statement indicating that government operations would be adjusted to emphasize peaceful activities. While the language may have appeared innocuous, the message conveyed a unilateral intent to reduce hostilities during Ramadan, signaling a strategic posture intended to create space for negotiation and to test the BRN’s willingness to reciprocate.
Thai officials have asserted that they communicated with the BRN through multiple channels about suspending offensive operations for Ramadan and expected a reciprocal gesture in return for resuming dialogue. A senior member of a BRN delegation indicated that the group had received this message, suggesting a degree of mutual awareness about the Ramadan pause. In early March, the BRN reportedly expressed to the facilitator its readiness to consider a bilateral, shorter-duration ceasefire, conditional upon the creation of an agreed monitoring mechanism. This development reflects a nuanced approach on the BRN’s side: the group was not necessarily opposed to a pause in violence, but insisted on verification and governance structures that could reassure both the Thai state and the international community.
Despite these gestures, the two sides have not reached a formal ceasefire agreement. The Thai and BRN proposals display a shared inclination toward de-escalation and dialogue, yet they stop short of a concrete “ceasefire” pact. The consensus within Bangkok, and among international observers, is that de-escalation can support talks but does not automatically guarantee a return to formal negotiations. The current dynamic suggests a pattern in which unilateral or bilateral reductions in violence serve as confidence-building measures, rather than preconditions for resuming dialogue. The facilitator’s role remains essential in translating these signals into practical steps, such as establishing a transparent monitoring regime, ensuring independent verification, and facilitating limited, controlled exchanges that build trust without exposing either side to political backlash at home.
In this environment, public messaging emphasizes that reducing violence is both a practical necessity and a political statement: it demonstrates a commitment to exploring a peaceful resolution, while avoiding the appearance of capitulation to insurgent demands. The emphasis on Ramadan highlights how religious and cultural contexts intersect with security policy, shaping how leaders frame risk, leverage, and legitimacy in the peace process. Yet, a recurring pattern remains: even when both sides contemplate a short-term pause, distrust, domestic political headwinds, and varying interpretations of “monitoring” ensure that a durable agreement remains out of reach. The Ramadan window thus acts as a proving ground for sincerity and capability, rather than a guaranteed prelude to a formal ceasefire and broader settlement.
Political dynamics in Bangkok: government posture, leadership, and delegation
Since assuming office in August, Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra has faced a careful balancing act in relation to the southern peace process. Critics, including some academics and former officials, have argued that the talks risk legitimizing the BRN without securing a credible, verifiable commitment to reduce violence and address core grievances. The prime minister has, at times, appeared hesitant to reconstitute a formal delegation for negotiations, a move that could be perceived domestically as weakness or vulnerability to political opposition. The absence of a visible delegation can hamper momentum, create uncertainty about Bangkok’s negotiating posture, and feed narratives that the government is wavering on a once-promising path toward peace.
In January, a policy review of the southern crisis was announced, signaling a willingness to re-evaluate strategies and potentially recalibrate how the government engages with the BRN and other insurgent groups. The results of this review remain pending, but the decision to reassess indicates a recognition that the long-running approach may require revision to achieve tangible, durable outcomes on the ground. The political calculus in Bangkok also reflects broader tensions around how to manage the peace process in a way that maintains public legitimacy, counters opposition framing, and avoids unilateral concessions that could be exploited by political rivals.
Against this backdrop, the regional and international environment adds pressure to act decisively. Malaysia’s leadership role within ASEAN and the attention of other regional actors heighten expectations that Bangkok will demonstrate a determined approach to peace talks. However, skeptics question whether the Thai government will risk domestic political capital for the sake of diplomacy, particularly when some academics and former officials argue that ongoing engagement with the BRN could inadvertently legitimize a group they view as an antagonist. The government’s policy stance remains guarded, emphasizing a desire to see a credible pathway to dialogue and to ensure that any agreement would be anchored in a sustainable political solution that safeguards Thai sovereignty while addressing local grievances.
BRN strategy and recent attacks: a warning against conditioned talks
The BRN’s strategic posture has been characterized by cautious engagement with the process, tempered by signaling that negotiations must proceed on terms that reflect their core aims and red lines. A December statement from the BRN warned that the potential for greater violence could emerge if the Thai government did not demonstrate seriousness in seeking a settlement. The group’s stance is consistent with a broader pattern in which insurgent actors leverage violence to signal priority concerns and test the government’s resolve to engage in meaningful negotiation.
Recent militant attacks have underscored the BRN’s willingness to act even as the dialogue continues in some form. The attack on a district office in Sungai Kolok, which resulted in two deaths and fourteen injuries, including civilians, illustrates the insurgents’ continued ability to strike symbolic and strategic targets. Such incidents underscore the BRN’s repudiation of the government’s premise that a ceasefire should precede talks. In this framing, dialogue becomes a prerequisite for stopping violence, even as the group continues to deploy violence to extract concessions or maintain leverage. The attacks thus inject urgency into the peace process, while raising concerns about the feasibility of achieving a durable ceasefire without robust verification mechanisms and credible monitoring arrangements.
The BRN has called for a monitored and accountable framework that could accompany any pause or ceasefire, highlighting the importance of transparency and trust-building. The concept of a monitoring mechanism is central to the BRN’s conditions for any potential bilateral ceasefire, and it aligns with broader regional norms around peace agreements that require verification to prevent backsliding. This insistence on monitoring reflects a practical approach to risk management in protracted conflicts: it seeks not only to halt violence but also to prevent a relapse into hostilities that could undermine confidence in future negotiations. While the BRN remains flexible to certain terms, its insistence on conditions for a ceasefire signals a strategic calculus that prioritizes durable arrangements over quick symbolic gestures.
Together, these dynamics point to a broader truth: both sides recognize that resuming dialogue is essential to ending the conflict, but both sides also guard against arrangements that could concede too much without securing durable outcomes. The BRN’s insistence on a credible monitoring framework and its willingness to consider a shorter-term ceasefire under defined conditions reflect a disciplined approach to negotiations, even as the group continues to pursue its broader political objectives. Observers stress that the pace and tone of the insurgents’ engagement will be a key determinant of whether Ramadan periods or other de-escalation windows yield meaningful progress toward a formal settlement.
ASEAN and regional peacemaking: Malaysia’s leadership, diplomacy, and personal diplomacy
Malaysia’s chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) this year has elevated the country’s role in regional diplomacy and peacemaking efforts, including in southern Thailand. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has signaled a determination to reinvigorate regional peace initiatives, recognizing that stability in the Thai south has broader implications for regional security, cross-border trade, and social cohesion among Malaysia’s own Malay-speaking communities near the border. In July 2024, Anwar announced the appointment of Datuk Haji Mohd Rabin bin Basir as the new regional facilitator, reinforcing the emphasis on informal, continuous engagement and the cultivation of trust between Bangkok and the BRN. This appointment reflects a strategy to maintain momentum through steady, low-profile diplomacy that complements formal negotiation channels.
In December, leaders Paetongtarn Shinawatra and Anwar Ibrahim issued a joint statement underscoring the JCPP as the basis for continuing dialogue and confidence-building measures. This joint statement highlights the shared belief that a credible framework is essential for progress, especially in a context where domestic political considerations and regional scrutiny intersect. Anwar also appointed Thaksin Shinawatra, the former Thai prime minister and Paetongtarn’s father, as an informal adviser on ASEAN issues during Malaysia’s chairmanship. Thaksin’s involvement is controversial within Thailand and carries symbolic weight: it signals a blended approach to diplomacy that leverages his influence and ties to the ruling family while aiming to preserve the appearance of a principled and constructive process.
Thaksin’s visit to the southern provinces on February 23 included an apology for past handling of the insurgency, aiming to create an atmosphere more conducive to talks. While the apology drew mixed reactions, supporters argued that it helped to soften reputational barriers and open space for dialogue, whereas critics cautioned that it might be used for political gain or to deepen entanglements with the insurgent leadership. Regardless of interpretations, the visit reflected a strategic effort to shape the emotional and political climate in ways that could facilitate negotiations. The broader regional strategy rests on maintaining momentum, creating opportunities for informal contact between representatives, and reinforcing a shared regional commitment to reducing violence while respecting sovereignty and domestic political dynamics.
Malaysia’s leadership role also reinforces the importance of cross-border dialogue and regional confidence-building mechanisms that can sustain the peace process even when formal negotiations encounter deadlocks. Observers emphasize that the regional dimension—especially through ASEAN’s platform—provides an invaluable channel for keeping discussion alive, encouraging transparency, and applying collective pressure on both sides to return to the table. The combination of high-level declarations, calculated diplomacy, and discreet, ongoing engagement is designed to reduce misperceptions and manage expectations, while building a credible pathway toward a comprehensive political solution that could address the grievances driving the southern conflict.
The way forward: leadership, trust, and the politics of compromise
The conflict in Thailand’s deep south remains at a critical juncture. The pause in official dialogue since the seventh plenary round in February last year, following the BRN’s refusal to sign the JCPP, has created a vacuum in which speculation and competing narratives can flourish. The central question is whether both sides can rekindle formal negotiations, sustain de-escalation measures, and move toward a political settlement that addresses governance, autonomy, and security concerns in a manner acceptable to local communities, Bangkok, and regional partners. The fate of dialogue depends on leadership—on leaders willing to make difficult decisions, defend concessions that are essential for peace, and resist politicization that could derail progress.
On one side, decision-makers in Bangkok must demonstrate a credible and consistent commitment to dialogue, including the timely appointment of a negotiating delegation, clear policy signals, and a public messaging strategy that explains how peace will be pursued without compromising national sovereignty or security. On the other side, BRN leaders must show that their insistence on a monitoring mechanism and other safeguards are not designed to stall negotiations but to ensure any ceasefire or de-escalation is durable and verifiable. The role of the facilitator—now reinforced by ASEAN leadership and Malaysia’s active diplomacy—will be to maintain and expand dialogue channels, encourage transparency, and help engineer practical steps that translate rhetoric into action on the ground.
The broader regional and international audience has a stake in the outcome. A successful resumption of talks and a credible framework for violence reduction would reassure local communities, attract investment, and strengthen regional stability. Conversely, failure to restart negotiations could leave communities exposed to renewed violence and entrain regional anxieties about cross-border spillovers, security implications, and human security concerns. In this context, leaders must summon the political courage to take strategic steps that prioritize the safety and futures of southern residents over short-term political gains, recognizing that a protracted conflict with high human costs destabilizes not just Thailand’s border provinces but the wider region.
There is urgent pressure on decision-makers on both sides to translate rhetoric into reality. Those who oppose dialogue are seeking pretexts to derail discussions, while those who favor engagement risk political backlash if gains are perceived as concessions that undercut national identity or security. The challenge is to foster a climate of trust that transcends electoral cycles and partisan controversies, enabling a steady, incremental process toward peace. The choices made today will shape the southern province’s trajectory for years to come, determining whether future generations will endure another generation of violence or witness a meaningful and durable settlement that reconciles security with local autonomy, development, and dignity for all communities affected by the conflict.
Matt Wheeler, International Crisis Group’s Senior Analyst for South East Asia, emphasizes the imperative of leadership and shared responsibility. The crisis in Thailand’s deep south demands not only tactical patience but strategic vision: an approach that reconciles immediate security needs with long-term political solutions, and that places the welfare of civilians at the center of every decision. As regional players intensify their diplomacy and local voices contribute to the conversation, the path toward peace becomes clearer but not guaranteed. The choices made by Bangkok, the BRN, and their international partners in the coming months will determine whether the region can escape the cycles of violence that have defined life in the deep south for far too long.
Conclusion
The southern Thai conflict and the enduring peace process remain intertwined, with Ramadan’s symbolic pause offering a moment to reflect on what it will take to break the cycle of violence. The BRN and the Thai government have signaled a willingness to take measured steps toward dialogue, but the road to a comprehensive settlement remains complex, contested, and contingent on credible monitoring, political will, and sustained international engagement. ASEAN’s regional leadership, Malaysia’s ongoing mediation, and the involvement of trusted intermediaries persist as critical factors in reviving formal negotiations and sustaining violence reduction. The region’s stability—and the safety and dignity of its people—depend on leaders who are prepared to make difficult, principled choices that prioritize peace over perpetual conflict. The future of Thailand’s deep south hinges on the courage of decision-makers to align strategic interests with the urgent needs of civilians living amid a long-running struggle, and on a durable commitment to a political solution that addresses governance, rights, and security in a way that can be sustained across generations.
